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Note 
 
Relative Futility: Limits to Genetic Privacy 
Protection Because of the Inability to Prevent 
Disclosure of Genetic Information by Relatives 
Trevor Woodage∗ 
In March 2009, Alan and Keri Bearder joined eight other 
families to sue the State of Minnesota and the Minnesota De-
partment of Health for violating the genetic privacy rights of 
their children.1 They claimed that in retaining, using, and dis-
seminating blood and genetic information derived from DNA 
samples taken from their children as part of a newborn genetic 
screening program without written, informed consent, the De-
partment of Health violated state genetic privacy law.2 The 
families alleged that they “suffered damages, including but not 
limited to, the fear of the use of their genetic information by 
government and unknown private entities.”3 
Indeed, many, if not most, of the fears expressed about ge-
netic privacy relate to concerns that other parties will gain 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; B. Med. 
Sci. 1982, University of Newcastle, N.S.W., Australia; B. Med. 1984, Universi-
ty of Newcastle, N.S.W., Australia; Ph.D. 1994, University of Sydney, N.S.W., 
Australia. I thank Professor William McGeveran for his insightful guidance in 
developing some of the concepts presented in this Note. I owe a debt of grati-
tude to the Editors of the Minnesota Law Review, in particular Joe Hansen, for 
constructive edits and comments. Many scientific colleagues developed my 
knowledge of, and interest in, genetics. Finally, nothing I do would be possible 
without the love and support of my family. Copyright © 2010 by Trevor  
Woodage. 
 1. See Bearder v. Minnesota, No. A10-101, 2010 WL 3307066 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Aug. 24, 2010); Complaint, Bearder v. Minnesota, No. 27-CV-09-5615 
(Hennepin County, Minn., Dist. Ct. Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www 
.cchconline.org/pr/FINAL_Plaintif_s_v_MDH_complaint.doc (last visited Nov. 
7, 2010); Press Release, Citizens’ Council on Health Care, Nine Families Sue 
State of Minnesota, Allege Violations of State Genetic Privacy Law in New-
born Screening (Mar. 11, 2009), available at http://www.cchconline.org/pr/ 
pr031109.php. 
 2. Press Release, Citizens’ Council on Health Care, supra note 1. 
 3. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 9. 
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access to personal genetic information.4 What perhaps is not 
widely appreciated is that genetic information is by its very na-
ture not private because all humans share common genetic in-
formation with their relatives.5 Identical twins are genetically 
the same, sharing essentially the same DNA sequences,6 while 
other relatives share progressively smaller fractions of their 
genetic code, depending upon the degree of relationship.7 These 
observations give rise to an apparent paradox: how is it possi-
ble to keep genetic information private when the very DNA se-
quence on which it is based is held in common with an open-
ended set of relatives? Federal and state legislation designed to 
preserve the privacy of genetic information largely fails to ad-
dress this issue.8 
This Note argues that strong protection of genetic privacy 
on an individual basis is likely to be an elusive goal. A more 
satisfactory approach may be to develop legislative solutions 
that ensure protection against uses of genetic information that 
run counter to individual interests. Part I of this Note describes 
existing approaches to genetic privacy and the manner in which 
they relate to the treatment of other types of personal informa-
tion. Part II analyzes several situations in which traditional 
approaches to genetic privacy based on individual concepts of 
 
 4. See, e.g., Editorial, Genetic Privacy, BOS. GLOBE, June 6, 1999, at G6 
(noting that legislators were “grappl[ing] with the basics of citizen [genetic] 
privacy, seeking to protect the individual from misuse of those secrets in a 
medical frontier that might easily become an Orwellian nightmare”); Douglas 
A. Levy, Experts Call for Genetic Privacy Legislation, UNITED PRESS INT’L, 
Oct. 18, 1991, available in LEXIS, Wire Service Stories (quoting U.S. Repre-
sentative John Conyers as saying that “[p]ublic release of people’s genetic in-
formation is a Pandora’s Box that is best left unopened”); Sharon Schmickle, 
Genetic-Privacy Fears Rippling Nationwide, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), 
Feb. 18, 2001, at 18A, available at 2001 WLNR 10302883 (quoting an em-
ployee subject to workplace genetic testing as saying, “I don’t want the entire 
world to know if someone in our family has a potential for a disease”).  
 5. See JAMES J. NORA ET AL., MEDICAL GENETICS: PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE 216 (4th ed. 1994) (“[A]lleles at linked loci tend to be inherited by 
offspring in the same combinations in which they occur in parents.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 6. See id. at 395 (“Identical . . . twins result from the splitting of a ferti-
lized egg, giving rise to two genetically identical individuals.”). 
 7. THOMAS D. GELEHRTER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL GENETICS 52 
(2d ed. 1998). 
 8. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.); 
NANCY LEE JONES & AMANDA K. SARATA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30006, 
GENETIC INFORMATION: LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO DISCRIMINATION AND 
PRIVACY (updated Mar. 10, 2008). 
  
684 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:682 
 
dominion over DNA sequence information will not adequately 
address confidentiality issues raised by the sharing of genetic 
sequences among relatives. It also addresses other legal para-
digms that relate to the issue of genetic privacy. Part III pro-
poses that such concerns could be addressed by educating 
people about the ways in which genetic information can be used 
and misused. Specifically, this Note concludes that protections 
against the misuse of genetic information should be strength-
ened and, in parallel, proposes that the federal government or 
the states develop legislation that would allow people to have 
access to their own genetic records and to know who else has 
access to the information. 
I.  TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO GENETIC PRIVACY   
As is too often the case with new technology, advances in 
genetic research and the practical applications of such research 
threaten to overtake the public’s readiness to understand these 
advances and the law’s ability to deal with them.9 This Part de-
scribes the types of information that new methods of genetic 
testing have made available. It also discusses the underpin-
nings of privacy as a protectable interest and current legal pro-
tections of genetic privacy. 
A. GENETIC INFORMATION AND GENETIC VARIATION 
Genetic information comes in different forms. It is general-
ly possible to tell if people have a Y chromosome just by looking 
at them.10 Physicians can confirm the presence of deleterious 
mutations that cause heritable diseases, such as cystic fibrosis 
or Huntington disease, by studying a patient’s pedigree.11 Yet, 
popular usage increasingly accepts that when people talk about 
genetic information they are referring to, either explicitly or 
implicitly, DNA sequence information.12 DNA is composed of 
 
 9. See, e.g., Editorial, Genetic Privacy, supra note 4, at G6 (describing the 
Massachusetts Legislature’s struggle to write genetic privacy laws that can 
keep up with the rapid scientific progress in the field). 
 10. See GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 178–79. 
 11. See id. at 23 (defining common genetic conditions as “diseases that are 
the result of a single mutant gene . . . that are inherited in simple patterns”). 
 12. See DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/10001177 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (“Scientists need 
to know the sequence of bases because it tells them the kind of genetic infor-
mation that is carried in a particular segment of DNA.”). 
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long chains of four types of molecules known as nucleotides.13 
The nucleotides are commonly abbreviated as A, C, G, and T, 
and it is the order of these nucleotides that makes up the ge-
netic information contained within DNA.14 The total set of DNA 
sequences contained within each organism is known as the ge-
nome.15 Humans carry two copies of the genome, one inherited 
from each parent,16 with each copy containing approximately 
three billion nucleotides.17 
The ability to read small portions of a person’s DNA se-
quence is now widely available, affordable, and used extensive-
ly for the study and diagnosis of genetic diseases.18 Continuing 
technological improvements make it possible to determine large 
amounts of genomic sequence for progressively lower costs.19 
The Human Genome Project, a large, multinational effort, fin-
ished sequencing the human genome for the first time in 2003 
at a total cost of approximately three billion dollars.20 In 2009, 
it was possible to sequence a human genome for less than fifty 
thousand dollars.21 It is widely expected that total sequencing 
costs will be less than a thousand dollars, perhaps as little as 
one hundred dollars, by 2015.22 The expectation that there will 
be ubiquitous demand for genome sequencing drives much of 
this cost reduction.23 At least part of this demand comes from 
the belief that examination of a person’s DNA sequence will al-
low doctors and patients to identify predispositions to common 
diseases and take steps to prevent or ameliorate the effects of 
illness.24 
 
 13. JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE 68 (4th 
ed. 1987). 
 14. See id. at 74, 86–87. For instance, three nucleotides in the order CGA 
instruct a cell to insert the amino acid arginine in a particular position in a 
protein, or the sequence TAA tells a cell to complete the synthesis of a protein. 
BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 367 (5th ed. 2008). 
 15. GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 11. 
 16. NORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 12. 
 17. Id. at 11. 
 18. See DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, supra note 12. 
 19. Id. 
 20. The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, 
NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/11006943 (last up-
dated Apr. 7, 2009). 
 21. John Markoff, I.B.M. Joins Pursuit of $1,000 Genome, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 2009, at D2, available at 2009 WLNR 19662265. 
 22. See id. (discussing technological advances and the timeline with which 
they are expected to reduce the total cost of sequencing the human genome). 
 23. See DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, supra note 12. 
 24. See Advanced Sequencing Technology Awards 2008, NAT’L HUMAN 
  
686 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:682 
 
Inherent in the notion that genetic information can be used 
for individualized diagnosis of genetic disease is the recognition 
that DNA sequences differ between people.25 If corresponding 
stretches of DNA are compared from any two human chromo-
somes, there will be, on average, a difference approximately 
once every thousand nucleotides.26 These sequence variants 
are, at least in part, responsible for differences between people, 
including physical characteristics,27 temperament and person-
ality,28 and risk of developing a wide range of diseases.29 While 
there is a vibrant debate regarding the relative contributions 
that genetic, environmental, and other factors make towards 
individual development, even the staunchest opponent of genet-
ic determinism would admit that an individual’s DNA sequence 
is an important determinant of personhood.30 This close associ-
ation between DNA sequence and identification of a person as 
an individual lies at the root of at least some calls for genetic 
privacy.31 
B. PRIVACY AS A PROTECTABLE INTEREST 
American privacy jurisprudence dates, in large part, from 
1890 with the publication of Samuel Warren and Louis Bran-
deis’s seminal article, The Right to Privacy.32 Facing technolo-
 
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/27527584 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See David E. Reich et al., Human Genome Sequence Variation and the 
Influence of Gene History, Mutation and Recombination, 32 NATURE GENETICS 
135, 135–36 (2002) (stating that the average rate of difference between two 
gene sequences was on the order of 0.1 percent). 
 27. See Hannah Pulker et al., Finding Genes that Underlie Physical Traits 
of Forensic Interest Using Genetic Tools, 1 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 100, 
102–03 (2007). 
 28. See M.R. Munafò et al., Genetic Polymorphisms and Personality in 
Healthy Adults: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 8 MOLECULAR 
PSYCHIATRY 471, 471–72 (2003). 
 29. See DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, supra note 12. 
 30. See George P. Smith, II & Thaddeus J. Burns, Genetic Determinism or 
Genetic Discrimination?, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 25–35 (1994) 
(discussing both the association between DNA sequence changes and complex 
traits and concerns that claims are being made that “one’s fate is determined 
by genetic inheritance”).  
 31. Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deep-
er Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 744–45 
(2004) (noting associations between genetic information, conceptions of self, 
and concerns about genetic privacy). 
 32. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193 (1890); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, 
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gical developments that threatened exposure of otherwise pri-
vate information,33 Warren and Brandeis proposed the recogni-
tion of a previously unprotected right—the right to privacy—
deserving of common law protections.34 Despite courts deciding 
over three hundred civil privacy cases after publication of the 
Warren and Brandeis article,35 it was not until 1960 that Dean 
William Prosser formally classified the privacy torts.36 Pross-
er’s analytical framework was highly influential.37 The four 
privacy torts that he described were subsequently recognized in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts,38 and have since been 
adopted either at common law or by statute in the great majori-
ty of jurisdictions in the United States.39 The privacy tort most 
relevant to genetic privacy is described in the Second Restate-
ment of Torts as “publicity given to private life.”40 It states that 
publicizing information relating to another’s private life that is 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “not of legitimate 
concern to the public” is subject to liability.41 
Although only protecting against possible government 
usurpation of available privileges, the Supreme Court in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut42 famously located a constitutional right to 
privacy because “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras . . . [that] create zones of privacy.”43 Although 
 
INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 10–12 (3d ed. 2009) (noting the origin and impor-
tance of the Warren and Brandeis article). 
 33. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 32, at 195 (“Instantaneous photo-
graphs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private 
and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good 
the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from 
the house-tops.’”). 
 34. See id. at 218–19 (suggesting that the invasion of privacy should be 
protected at common law as are other personal interests). 
 35. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 26. 
 36. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) 
(characterizing the four privacy torts as: (1) “Intrusion upon the plaintiff ’s se-
clusion or solitude”; (2) “Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about 
the plaintiff ”; (3) “Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the 
public eye”; and (4) “Appropriation . . . of the plaintiff ’s name or likeness”). 
 37. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 27. 
 38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B–652E (1977). 
 39. See, e.g., Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 234–35 
(Minn. 1998). 
 40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D. 
 41. Id. 
 42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 43. Id. at 484. 
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Griswold’s protections related to marital privacy,44 the Su-
preme Court subsequently extended substantive due process 
protections to information privacy.45 Despite this case law, 
there is an unresolved circuit split as to whether there is a con-
stitutional right to protection against disclosure of personal in-
formation.46 Nine circuits support a constitutional right to pro-
tection against such disclosures.47 However, the Sixth Circuit 
denies the existence of a constitutional right to privacy in per-
sonal information,48 while the Eighth Circuit only regards the 
right as applicable in instances involving egregious disclo-
sure.49 
In addition to federal constitutional protections, a number 
of states have constitutional provisions directly providing for 
the protection of privacy.50 Interestingly, the Supreme Court of 
California held that, unlike most such provisions, the Califor-
nian constitutional right to privacy applies not only to state 
agencies, but also to private entities.51 Clearly then, a range of 
common law and constitutional protections can apply in any 
particular situation. The next section examines how other, es-
pecially statutory, protections apply to issues associated with 
genetic information. 
C. STATUTORY PROTECTION OF GENETIC PRIVACY 
Under one view, a person’s DNA is personal property. As 
such, it is rightly considered subject to control by its “owner,” 
and consequently deserves privacy protection.52 In Moore v. Re-
 
 44. See id. at 485–86. 
 45. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (noting that constitution-
al protection of privacy extends to an “individual interest in avoiding disclo-
sure of personal matters”). 
 46. Diane M. DeGroat, Comment, When Students Test Positive, Their Pri-
vacy Fails: The Unconstitutionality of South Carolina’s HIV/AIDS Reporting 
Requirement, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 751, 761–62 (2009). 
 47. Id. at 761; see also, e.g., Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 
(4th Cir. 1990); Daury v. Smith, 842 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); Fadjo v. Coon, 
633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 48. Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 49. Alexander v. Peffer, 993 F.2d 1348, 1350 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 50. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 34; see also Mark Silverstein, 
Note, Privacy Rights in State Constitutions: Models for Illinois?, 1989 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 215, 226–58 (reviewing existing state constitutional provisions as they 
relate to the protection of privacy). 
 51. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994). 
 52. See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in 
GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE 
GENETIC ERA 31, 49 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) (“Proprietary genetic priva-
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gents of the University of California,53 the California Supreme 
Court upset this expectation.54 In this widely cited case, the 
court held that a patient’s property interests did not extend to 
spleen cells that a surgeon removed from his body.55 Based on 
Moore and similar decisions, several scholars have argued that 
property rights are unlikely to provide meaningful protection of 
genetic privacy.56 
Beyond the apparent inability of property rights to protect 
genetic privacy and the incomplete privacy protections afforded 
by constitutional law,57 there are both federal and state statu-
tory safeguards for genetic privacy. The Privacy Act of 1974 
prohibits disclosure of records maintained on individuals by 
federal government agencies except under specified condi-
tions.58 Although providing for private rights of action59 and 
criminal penalties,60 it does not provide broad genetic privacy 
protections, because the statute applies only to federal agen-
cies61 and requires that a plaintiff show that any violation was 
“willful and intentional.”62 
Congress created provisions that were more generally ap-
plicable to protecting the privacy of genetic information 
through passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act (HIPAA) in 1996.63 The main purpose of 
 
cy is further suggested by the related notion that human DNA is owned by the 
persons from whom it is taken, as a species of private property.”). 
 53. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 54. See id. at 488–93. 
 55. See id. (holding that a patient’s ownership interest over his cells does 
not extend beyond the time the cells were taken from his body). 
 56. See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. 
REV. 359, 434–36 (2000) (“[P]roperty traditionally implies alienability 
. . . . Privacy, on the other hand, does not carry the same connotations. Per-
sonal privacy encompasses the right to possess one’s own body and the right to 
exclude others, but does not embrace the power to give, sell, or otherwise 
transfer body rights to other individuals.” (citations omitted)); Suter, supra 
note 31, at 746 (“[T]he property model is deeply problematic as a tool to protect 
our interests in genetic information.”). 
 57. See supra Part I.B (noting that constitutional privacy protections gener-
ally only protect against government actors and describing the circuit split over 
whether there is a constitutional right to protection of personal information).  
 58. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 59. Id. § 552a(g)(1). 
 60. Id. § 552a(i). 
 61. Id. § 552a(a)(1). 
 62. Id. § 552a(g)(4). 
 63. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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HIPAA was to allow employees to move between employers 
without having their new health insurance plans exclude pre-
existing conditions from coverage.64 Congress was also con-
cerned about the privacy and security of medical data that in-
surers would transmit when they processed insurance claims.65 
Rather than directly creating privacy rules within HIPAA, 
Congress authorized the Department of Health and Human 
Services to propose regulations.66 A final version of those rules 
went into effect in 2002.67 The regulations defined the informa-
tion that was covered as “[i]ndividually identifiable health in-
formation,” that “[r]elates to the past, present, or future physi-
cal or mental health or condition of an individual . . . . and 
. . . [t]hat identifies the individual; or . . . there is a reasonable 
basis to believe the information can be used to identify the in-
dividual.”68 This definition includes genetic information as well 
as information about an individual’s family history.69 A signifi-
cant limitation of the scope of privacy protections under HIPAA 
comes from the fact that the regulations do not apply to all in-
dividuals or entities with access to an individual’s health in-
formation; instead, they apply to “health plans[,] . . . health 
care clearinghouses[,] . . . [and] health care provider[s].”70 
The most recent federal attempt to secure genetic informa-
tion was the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
(GINA).71 Congress primarily intended this legislation to pro-
hibit discrimination based on a person’s genetic makeup in 
health insurance and employment settings.72 However, using a 
broad definition of “genetic information,”73 GINA also explicitly 
 
 64. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 431. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 431–32. 
 67. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 
67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
 68. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2009). 
 69. JONES & SARATA, supra note 8, at CRS-19. 
 70. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102. 
 71. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 72. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 507. 
 73. 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(d) (Supp. II 2008) (defining “genetic information” to 
mean “with respect to any individual, information about—(i) such individual’s 
genetic tests, (ii) the genetic tests of family members of such individual, and 
(iii) the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such indi-
vidual,” and “genetic test” as the “analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromo-
somes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, mutations, or chromo-
somal changes”). 
  
2010] RELATIVE FUTILITY 691 
 
defines such data as health information for privacy purposes 
under HIPAA.74 A comprehensive discussion of GINA is beyond 
the scope of this Note, but the Act received a mixed critical 
reaction and is likely not the last piece of federal legislation in 
this field.75 
Perhaps due to the perception of slow or limited action in 
the federal arena, a convincing majority of state legislatures 
enacted laws relating to the use of genetic information.76 Again, 
much of the impetus behind these bills arose from concerns re-
lating to employment or health insurance discrimination.77 
Nonetheless, a recent survey of state legislative developments 
revealed that twenty-seven states required consent to disclose 
genetic information and eighteen states provided specific penal-
ties for violations of genetic privacy.78 
The existence of this broad range of legal protection of ge-
netic privacy—common law, constitutional, statutory—seems to 
be completely consistent with the suggestion that control of 
access to genetic information is a worthwhile goal. There are, 
however, arguments against relying on genetic privacy to pro-
tect underlying autonomy interests, both because maintaining 
confidentiality of genetic information is not always desired, or 
desirable, and because of inherent limits to the extent to which 
confidentiality can be maintained. 
II.  LIMITS TO GENETIC PRIVACY   
Although a variety of legal approaches to the protection of 
genetic privacy interests exist, legislators and other concerned 
 
 74. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-9(a)(1), 1320d(4)(B) (Supp. II 2008). 
 75. See, e.g., Timothy J. Aspinwall, Imperfect Remedies: Legislative Efforts 
to Prevent Genetic Discrimination, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121, 122–23 (2010) 
(describing health insurance protection under GINA, but noting that the legis-
lation fails to protect against the use of genetic information in the context of 
long-term care, disability, or life insurance); Mark A. Rothstein, Is GINA 
Worth the Wait?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 174, 177 (2008) (noting both the sym-
bolic value of declaring a policy against genetic discrimination and the dangers 
of genetic exceptionalism—giving genetic information a privileged status as 
compared with other forms of health information); Joanne Barken, Note, 
Judging GINA: Does the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
Offer Adequate Protection?, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 545, 572–77 (2009) (arguing 
that additional legislation will be needed to ensure adequate protection 
against use of genetic information in employment situations). 
 76. See JONES & SARATA, supra note 8, at CRS-20 to CRS-21. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www 
.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/GeneticPrivacyLaws/tabid/14287/Default.aspx 
(last updated Jan. 2008) (citing survey information current as of January 2008). 
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parties seem to have paid less attention to two particular is-
sues. First, those parties have failed to focus on why the confi-
dentiality of genetic information should be maintained, and, 
second, whether there are inherent limits to the amount of pro-
tection that can be given to genetic information. This Part dis-
cusses situations in which people may not desire genetic priva-
cy or may even be harmed when genetic information is kept 
confidential. 
A. GENETIC PRIVACY: ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE THE HARM 
Before delving more deeply into factors that might limit a 
person’s ability to keep their DNA sequence a secret, it is worth 
considering why such secrecy is even at issue. Why do people 
want genetic privacy? Do people even really want to keep their 
genetic information private? Moreover, what harm could occur 
through unconsented access to DNA sequence information? 
Consideration of these questions will help people understand 
what efforts they should take to try to keep their genetic infor-
mation confidential or, alternatively, what steps they should 
take to minimize the chance of harm occurring through disclo-
sure of this information. 
1. Why Do People Want Genetic Privacy? 
It is likely that some of the reasons underlying an individ-
ual’s interest in maintaining the privacy of genetic information 
are the same as those for wanting to keep any personal infor-
mation confidential.79 There is a widely held belief that genetic 
information is an individual’s “property” and that control over 
access to that information is one of the rights of ownership.80 
There is also a long-standing belief that establishing a distinc-
tion between public and private domains is essential to the de-
velopment of an autonomous sense of self.81 Another common 
 
 79. GRAEME LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL 
NORMS 203–05 (2002). 
 80. See Margaret Everett, The Social Life of Genes: Privacy, Property and 
the New Genetics, 56 SOC. SCI. & MED. 53, 56–58 (2003) (discussing different 
approaches taken to the “genes as property” debate). But see Moore v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 493 (Cal. 1990) (refusing to recognize an 
ownership interest in human body parts). 
 81. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 71 (1958) (“[T]he four 
walls of one’s private property offer the only reliable hiding place from the 
common public world . . . . A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of 
others, becomes . . . shallow.”); Edward Shils, Privacy: Its Constitution and Vi-
cissitudes, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 283 (1966) (“The ‘private life’ is a 
secluded life, a life separated from the compelling burdens of public authority.”). 
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belief is the idea that privacy relates not only to keeping infor-
mation about oneself from the public domain, but also to con-
trolling the information that one makes available to others.82 It 
is possible to differentiate between “spatial” privacy, restricting 
access to a person’s physical or psychological self, and “informa-
tional” privacy, restricting access about personal information.83 
The second of these concepts is that which is most closely asso-
ciated with the common public understanding of privacy and is 
most relevant to the discussion of genetic privacy.84 
Part of the motivation for wanting to keep genetic informa-
tion secret may come from a belief that the information stored 
in one’s DNA represents a “diary” of sorts that reveals insights 
about one’s self and one’s future.85 Treatment of genetic infor-
mation as having unique characteristics is known as “genetic 
exceptionalism.”86 Based on this concept, some argue that DNA 
sequence information warrants special forms of privacy protec-
tion.87 Consider, for example, one expression of this claim: “[i]f 
genes determine aspects of our being and we cannot control our 
genes, we feel the more dire need to control others’ access to our 
genes and the information contained in them.”88 The belief in 
the special importance of genetic data helps to feed concerns 
that malefactors could use this powerful information against 
the best interests of its “owner” and establishes the nexus be-
tween concerns about genetic privacy and genetic discrimina-
tion.89 Many individuals and interest groups have cited fears 
relating to the possibility of genetic discrimination as a reason 
 
 82. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (“Privacy is 
not simply an absence of information about what is in the minds of others; 
rather it is the control we have over information about ourselves.”). 
 83. LAURIE, supra note 79, at 6. 
 84. Id. at 6 n.27. 
 85. See George J. Annas, Genetic Prophecy and Genetic Privacy, 32 TRIAL 
19, 20 (1996) (“The information in one’s DNA can be thought of as a coded 
probabilistic future diary because it describes an important part of a person’s 
unique future and, as such, can affect and undermine our view of ourself and 
our life’s possibilities.”). 
 86. Margaret Everett, Can You Keep a (Genetic) Secret? The Genetic Pri-
vacy Movement, 13 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 273, 274 (2004). 
 87. See Annas, supra note 85, at 25 (“To the extent that we accord special 
status to our genes and what they reveal, genetic information is uniquely pow-
erful and uniquely personal, and thus merits unique privacy protection.”). 
 88. KEVIN M. KEENAN, INVASION OF PRIVACY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 
143 (2005). 
 89. See Everett, supra note 86, at 277 (commenting on the relationship 
between genetic privacy and discrimination). 
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for restricting access to genetic information.90 These concerns 
were also the prime motivation for the enactment of legislation 
protecting genetic privacy.91 Advocates for legislative safe-
guards were most worried about genetic discrimination in em-
ployment,92 and with respect to health insurance.93 Recent pas-
sage of health care reform legislation will likely do much to 
reduce consumers’ fears that they could be denied health in-
surance because insurers will not be able to deny such insur-
ance due to preexisting conditions after 2014.94 While this Note 
is primarily concerned with the subject of genetic privacy, it is 
relevant to mention that, despite great concerns regarding the 
potential for genetic discrimination, it is controversial whether 
actual genetic discrimination has occurred to any great ex-
tent.95 Another apparent result of genetic exceptionalism has 
been the development of what are sometimes poorly defined 
fears relating to the possible misuse of genetic information by 
 
 90. See Patricia Nemeth & Terry W. Bonnette, Genetic Discrimination in 
Employment, 88 MICH. B.J. 42, 45 (2009) (“‘[M]any people were concerned that 
genetic information could be used by employers to discriminate in hiring or 
promotion decisions.’” (quoting MICH. LEG., FIRST ANALYSIS, SB 593, 90th 
Sess., at 1 (2000), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/1999 
-2000/billanalysis/House/htm/1999-HLA-0593-A.htm); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, 
President Calls for Genetic Privacy Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A14, 
available at 2007 WLNR 978490 (quoting President Bush’s statement that “it 
is important that [genetic] information not be exploited in improper ways”); 
supra note 4. 
 91. See supra Part I.C. 
 92. See, e.g., William J. McDevitt, I Dream of GINA: Understanding the 
Employment Provisions of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 
2008, 54 VILL. L. REV. 91, 93–96 (2009) (indicating that employment-related 
safeguards were among the chief concerns related to genetic discrimination 
under GINA). 
 93. See, e.g., Amy Harmon, Fear of Insurance Trouble Leads Many to 
Shun or Hide DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 
WLNR 3619695; Kathy L. Hudson et al., Genetic Discrimination and Health 
Insurance: An Urgent Need for Reform, 270 SCIENCE 391, 392 (1995). 
 94. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, § 2704, 124 Stat. 119, 154; see also Peter Grier, Health Care Reform Bill 
101: Rules for Preexisting Conditions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 24, 
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 7558052. 
 95. See Pauline T. Kim, Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Per-
spectives from the U.S. Experience, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 693, 695–96 
(2010) (noting the rarity of cases of employment discrimination based on the 
use of genetic information in the United States); Jeffrey S. Morrow, Note, In-
suring Fairness: The Popular Creation of Genetic Antidiscrimination, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 215, 225–26 (2009) (reviewing evidence for and against the occurrence of 
frequent instances of genetic discrimination). 
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government actors, such as the concerns raised by opponents of 
newborn screening programs.96 
Despite the similarities between genetic privacy and other 
forms of privacy, there are differences. One interesting and im-
portant distinction is the potential desire for privacy from one-
self, that is, choosing not to find out one’s own DNA sequence. 
Unlike other forms of personal information, sequence data is 
not “known” by an individual until there is a technological in-
tervention—DNA sequencing. Especially in the context of ge-
netic diseases that lack effective treatments, patients may 
choose not to know whether they carry mutations.97 Indeed, 
there is some evidence suggesting that after learning that they 
would develop a fatal genetic condition, some carriers have cho-
sen to attempt or commit suicide more commonly than would 
otherwise have been the case.98 
This discussion demonstrates that someone might choose 
to keep their genetic information private for a host of reasons. 
The most convincing of these arguments, however, seem to re-
late more to the occurrence of some manifest harm (denial of 
employment opportunities or health insurance) than to more 
abstract denials of personal autonomy. 
2. Do People Want Genetic Privacy? 
Having considered factors potentially leading to a desire 
for genetic privacy, it is worth taking a step back and asking 
whether most people actually care about keeping their DNA 
sequence information confidential. Despite a variety of theoret-
ical rationales supporting calls for genetic privacy, there is em-
 
 96. See CCHC Testimony on MN Plan to Mandate Genetic Testing of New-
borns, CITIZENS’ COUNCIL ON HEALTHCARE (Mar. 20, 2003) http://www 
.cchconline.org/testimony/t032003.php (discussing state government plans to 
implement a database for newborn genetic screening purposes: “This is not the 
proper role of government in a free society. History has shown the less than 
beneficent activities that can occur where such data systems exist”); see also 
Bradley Graham, DNA Sampling Sparks Worries Two Marines Take Privacy 
Issues to Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 14, 1996, at A22, available at 1996 
WLNR 1342647 (citing concerns about the uses intended by the government 
for genetic information obtained as a result of acquiring DNA samples from 
military personnel). 
 97. Tuija Takala & Heta Aleksandra Gylling, Who Should Know About 
Our Genetic Makeup and Why?, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 171, 172 (2000) (noting 
that possible carriers are not under a prudential obligation to confirm their 
mutation status if a disease is incurable). 
 98. Elisabeth W. Almqvist et al., A Worldwide Assessment of the Frequen-
cy of Suicide, Suicide Attempts, or Psychiatric Hospitalization After Predictive 
Testing for Huntington Disease, 64 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 1293, 1300–01 (1999). 
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pirical evidence of widespread public support for the use of ge-
netic information in a range of settings, at least some of which 
are not compatible with universal genetic privacy protection.99 
Public concerns with genetic information seem to coalesce 
around worries associated with particular uses of that informa-
tion, particularly possible employment and insurance discrimi-
nation.100 Studies of people whose relatives have had cancer 
support the argument that some individuals are concerned 
about the use of genetic information because of fears about po-
tential genetic discrimination—they appear more likely than 
the general public to express concerns about who has access to 
their genetic information.101 
Surveys of both the public and research study participants 
indicate the widespread support for the use of genetic informa-
tion for research.102 An interesting, and large-scale, example of 
this phenomenon comes from Iceland where, despite the fact 
that deCODE Genetics, a private company, is carrying out 
much of the research,103 the Icelandic public generally supports 
 
 99. An online survey carried out in August 2006 examined the opinions of 
3091 U.S. adults towards genetics and the uses of genetic information. Public 
Overwhelmingly Supportive of Genetic Science and Its Use for a Wide Variety 
of Medical, Law Enforcement and Personal Purposes, HARRIS INTERACTIVE 
(Aug. 30, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/allnewsbydate.asp? 
NewsID=1088 [hereinafter HARRIS INTERACTIVE]. Ninety-three percent of re-
spondents agreed that the “science of genetics and DNA” was a “very good [or] 
good thing.” Id. The same percentage of respondents strongly or somewhat 
supported the use of genetic information “[t]o identify criminals in rape, mur-
der and other crimes.” Id. Eighty-five percent or more of those surveyed were 
similarly supportive of the use of genetic information for establishing paterni-
ty, carrying out research to find new ways to prevent or treat diseases, testing 
by doctors to identify diseases for which people are at risk, and tracing one’s 
family tree and ancestors. Id. 
 100. See id. (stating that only fourteen percent of respondents supported 
the use of genetic information by insurance companies to determine who to 
insure and how much to charge, while twelve percent supported its use by em-
ployers to help decide whether to employ a person). 
 101. See Kira A. Apse et al., Perceptions of Genetic Discrimination Among 
At-Risk Relatives of Colorectal Cancer Patients, 6 GENETICS MED. 510, 513 
tbl.2 (2004) (noting, for instance, that forty-seven percent of survey partici-
pants would be likely or very likely to ask that their genetic test results be ex-
cluded from their medical record). 
 102. See Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic Privacy to Open Consent, 
9 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 406, 408 (2008) (citing the willingness of sub-
jects to participate in genetic research); HARRIS INTERACTIVE, supra note 99 
(stating that ninety-one percent of survey participants supported the use of 
genetic information for genetic disease research). 
 103. See Sarah Lyall, A Country Unveils Its Gene Pool and Debate Flares, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at F1, available at 1999 WLNR 3030501 (explain-
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access to genetic information.104 With a genetically homogene-
ous population of approximately 280,000 people and a well-
developed medical record system, geneticists regard Iceland as 
particularly fertile ground for studies aimed at identifying dis-
ease genes.105 The database cataloguing the study’s subjects 
and their family members contains information on almost half 
the people who have ever lived in Iceland.106 While Icelanders 
may be particularly well disposed to participating in genetic re-
search because of pride in their homogeneous ancestry,107 they 
exemplify the willingness to allow access to personal genetic in-
formation also seen in the United States in the research set-
ting.108 
In an interesting paradigm shift, the Personal Genome 
Project (PGP), an initiative exploring issues related to genome 
sequencing of individuals, moved from traditional conceptions 
of genetic privacy to an “open consent” model for its genetic re-
search and DNA sequencing.109 The PGP provides for open-
access distribution of sequence data and medical information, 
with the aim of developing an improved understanding of the 
ways in which scientists and physicians can use genetic infor-
mation for medical research.110 The first ten participants in the 
program, the PGP-10, volunteered to make their names, per-
sonal medical histories, and full genome sequences publicly 
available.111 Although beginning as a small-scale pilot project, 
 
ing the breadth of the deCODE project). 
 104. See Gísli Pálsson & Kristín E. Harðardóttir, For Whom the Cell Tolls: 
Debates About Biomedicine, 43 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 271, 283 (2002) (not-
ing that many Icelanders were eager to contribute their blood samples and 
medical records to genetic research programs). 
 105. Id. at 275–76. 
 106. Id. at 277; see also id. (noting also that Icelanders have a particular 
interest in maintaining comprehensive family trees). 
 107. See id. at 283 (“Many Icelanders seem proud of their ‘Nordic’ roots and 
their genetic makeup, and they are eager to ‘offer’ their ‘unique’ blood samples 
and medical records . . . to science and the advancement of human well-being.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 108. See supra notes 99, 102 and accompanying text. 
 109. See Lunshof et al., supra note 102, at 406. 
 110. See Mission, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org/ 
mission.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (discussing the goals of the project, 
among which is to improve “understanding of personal genomics and its poten-
tial”). 
 111. PGP-10, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org/ 
pgp10.html (last updated Mar. 16, 2009). 
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the PGP plans to enroll up to 100,000 participants.112 That over 
11,000 people registered for information about participating in 
the PGP demonstrates that a substantial number of people ap-
pear to be willing to allow open access to their genetic informa-
tion.113 
The willingness of large numbers of individuals involved in 
medical research or initiatives such as the PGP to allow access 
to their DNA sequence and other genetic information shows 
that a desire for strict maintenance of genetic privacy is not 
universal. 
3. The Flip Side: Can Genetic Privacy Do Harm? 
Even assuming an increasing acceptance of the notion that 
strict maintenance of genetic privacy is not necessary in all cir-
cumstances, there may also be times when restricting access to 
genetic information can actually be harmful. 
While a person might choose to keep genetic information 
private from herself when faced with the prospect of finding 
that she might carry a mutation for an untreatable genetic 
condition,114 in a different circumstance, she might instead 
choose not to know when there was a chance that she might be 
at risk of developing a preventable or treatable disorder. Such 
scenarios are well known in the case of common malignancies 
such as breast cancer, with knowledge of carrier status allow-
ing for effective preventative measures.115 A person’s right not 
to know this type of information can be justified on the grounds 
of autonomy or individual self-determination.116 The situation 
 
 112. See Events, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, http://www.personalgenomes.org/ 
events/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (noting that the Harvard Medical School In-
stitutional Review Board approved the involvement of one participant in the 
PGP in 2005, expanded that approval to ten participants in 2006, and again 
expanded approval to 100,000 participants in 2008). 
 113. See Newsletter #1, PERS. GENOME PROJECT (Apr. 2009), http://www 
.personalgenomes.org/newsletter/01.html. 
 114. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 115. Deborah Schrag et al., Life Expectancy Gains from Cancer Prevention 
Strategies for Women with Breast Cancer and BRCA1 or BRCA2 Mutations, 
283 JAMA 617, 617 (2000).  
 116. See R. Andorno, The Right Not to Know: An Autonomy Based Ap-
proach, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 435, 436–37 (2004) (discussing the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the “right not to know”). But cf. Gillian Nycum et al., Intra-
Familial Obligations to Communicate Genetic Risk Information: What Foun-
dations? What Forms?, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 21, 42–45 (2009) (suggesting 
that people might owe a duty of care to their genetic relatives and would thus 
be obliged to disclose knowledge of mutations associated with disease risk). 
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becomes more complicated, though, when a person’s exercise of 
a right not to know could affect the health of another. For ex-
ample, a man might decide that he did not want to know that 
he carried a mutation in a gene that was associated with a high 
risk of developing breast cancer in females. His sister, however, 
might have wanted to have been alerted to a need to be tested 
for the mutation, and, if she proved positive, to take steps to 
reduce her chance of developing cancer. This type of considera-
tion suggests that it would be appropriate to limit the right not 
to know in certain circumstances.117 These situations can, of 
course, be particularly complicated in the case of parental con-
sent to genetic tests for minor children, where considerations of 
the importance of genetic information to other family members 
are further complicated by children’s autonomy becoming sub-
servient to that of their parents.118 
These considerations provide evidence for the contention 
that unfettered restrictions on the dissemination of genetic in-
formation can, at least in some circumstances, result in harm. 
Difficult issues arise when the autonomy interests of different 
individuals are balanced. At the least, these concerns strength-
en arguments for flexibility in access to genetic information 
when benefits outweigh harms. However, even when a person’s 
interests in keeping DNA sequence information confidential are 
not challenged by a need for access by others, that person’s 
ability to prevent others from reaching conclusions about that 
sequence information may be constrained by factors beyond his 
control. 
B. LIMITS TO GENETIC PRIVACY 
Many things outside a person’s control can result in the vi-
olation of his or her genetic privacy. Such forces include acci-
dental or intentionally malicious data release, hacking, and 
hardware and data theft.119 While this Note will not discuss 
 
 117. See Andorno, supra note 116, at 439 (noting that the right not to know 
“is a relative right, in the sense that it may be restricted when disclosure to 
the individual is necessary in order to avoid serious harm to third parties, es-
pecially family members”); see also Nycum et al., supra note 116, at 39–47 
(discussing possible moral and legal obligations requiring disclosure of genetic 
information to at-risk family members). 
 118. See Lainie Friedman Ross & Margaret R. Moon, Ethical Issues in Ge-
netic Testing of Children, 154 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 873, 
873–74 (2000) (discussing implications of parental control over consent for ge-
netic tests). 
 119. Lunshof et al., supra note 102, at 407.  
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these computer technology-related occurrences in any more de-
tail, the fact that computerized databases containing personal 
data can be targets of malevolent activity provides a back-
ground level of concern that, no matter what the “owners” of 
genetic information choose to do with that information, the ul-
timate disposition of the data may be beyond their influence. 
Indeed, a primary thesis of this Note is that, by its very nature, 
people cannot exert complete dominion over their genetic in-
formation and, for that reason, concerns about genetic privacy, 
as such, warrant reconsideration. Factors limiting genetic pri-
vacy include sharing of DNA sequence information between 
relatives and computational techniques that can identify specif-
ic individuals from large DNA sequence databases. These con-
cepts coalesce with recent developments in the ability of crime 
investigators to use partial forensic matches to identify sus-
pects based on their relationship to defendants that have al-
ready been typed by DNA forensic laboratories. 
1. DNA Sequence Information as a Shared Attribute 
Except for identical twins120 and, potentially in the future, 
clones,121 no two human beings have identical genomic DNA 
sequences.122 This unique association between each person and 
his DNA sequence would seem to support a strong, and pro-
tectable, privacy interest. However, of course, people did not 
create their own DNA; rather, they inherited it from their par-
ents, with equal maternal and paternal contributions.123 Simi-
larly, everyone shares DNA sequences to a greater or lesser de-
gree with family members, depending upon the degree of 
genetic relatedness.124 That is not to say, of course, that be-
cause a scientist knows the complete genetic sequence of some-
one’s mother, brother, or daughter, that she knows the precise 
content of fifty percent of that person’s genetic code. Rather, 
the scientist can make a probabilistic statement that the index 
 
 120. NORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 395. 
 121. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Chal-
lenges to Bans on Human Cloning, HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 647 (1998) (noting 
that clones are genetically identical to the source individual except for the mi-
nor contribution from mitochondrial DNA). 
 122. See A.J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-Specific “Fingerprints” of Human 
DNA, 316 NATURE 76, 76–77 (1985) (describing the development of a genetic 
test producing results that are “completely specific to an individual”). 
 123. See NORA ET AL., supra note 5, at 6–7 (describing the formation of an 
embryo from equal numbers of chromosomes from each gamete). 
 124. See GELEHRTER ET AL., supra note 7, at 52. 
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subject shares half the DNA sequence of his first-degree rela-
tive, but it is not possible to say precisely which parts of the se-
quence are in common.125 With the availability of DNA se-
quence information from multiple relatives, however, it is 
possible to make increasingly certain inferences about the DNA 
sequence that is present in a specific person.126 There are sev-
eral ways that shared DNA sequences could manifest as limita-
tions on a person’s ability to maintain genetic privacy. For in-
stance, someone whose father died of Huntington disease, a 
rare, fatal neurodegenerative condition inherited by fifty per-
cent of a sufferer’s offspring,127 might decide that she did not 
want to know whether she carried the mutation. If that per-
son’s daughter decided that she did want to be tested and, for 
whatever reason, announced to the world that she had inher-
ited the mutation, then her parent would, in effect, be “outed” 
as a carrier, despite his wishes to the contrary. 
While formally prohibited by GINA,128 it would be difficult 
to prove the possibility that a health insurer had decided to de-
ny coverage to relatives of known mutation carriers. While the 
insurer would not be certain the people it denied coverage car-
ried mutations themselves, even a fifty percent chance of avoid-
ing the high cost of treating a cancer patient might be attrac-
tive.129 While there is little evidence that insurers or other 
 
 125. Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Data-
bases to Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 248, 251–52 (2006) (dis-
cussing the degree and random nature of DNA sharing by relatives). 
 126. If individuals Alan, Bill, and Charlie are grandfather, son, and grand-
son, respectively, and an investigator had access to DNA sequence information 
from Alan and Charlie, then it would be possible to make accurate predictions 
about Bill’s DNA sequence. For example, if at a particular region on chromosome 
fifteen, Alan had chromosomal sequences of CCTGATGC and CATGGTGT 
(one copy inherited from each of Alan’s parents; underlined letters indicate 
nucleotides that vary between individuals), and Charlie’s sequence showed 
CCTGGTGC and CATGGTGT, then an investigator could predict with a rea-
sonable degree of certainty that Bill carried at least one copy of CATGGTGT, the 
sequence that Charlie had inherited—through Bill—from his grandfather Alan. 
 127. Michael R. Hayden & Berry Kremer, Basal Ganglia Disorders, in 2 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS 2197, 2203–07 (David L. 
Rimoin et al. eds., 3d ed. 1997) (describing the fatal nature of the disorder and 
stating that it is inherited in an autosomal dominant manner, i.e., that half of 
a carrier’s offspring will inherit the disease). 
 128. See 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(d)(6)(a) (Supp. II 2008) (including the use of DNA 
test results or disease manifestations in relatives under prohibited conduct). 
 129. See Economic Impact of Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer 
.org/cancer/cancerbasics/economic-impact-of-cancer (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) 
(noting the estimated health expenditures for cancer topped ninety-three bil-
lion dollars in 2008). 
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potential users of genetic information have denied benefits or 
otherwise discriminated against the relatives of mutation car-
riers,130 there is evidence to suggest that these relatives are 
concerned about what might be termed genetic discrimination 
by proxy.131 
Whatever might occur in other settings, it is certainly the 
case that, in most research settings, direct consent from the 
subjects involved, and not from their relatives, is all that is re-
quired for genetic investigations and publications of DNA se-
quence data.132 Indeed, even in high-profile sequencing pro-
grams, such as the PGP, the most that research subjects are 
asked to do is to consider the impact of their participation in 
the research; there is no requirement that close relatives also 
provide consent.133 
2. Identification of Individuals from Large Data Sets 
One of the primary ways that people have been able to 
maintain a level of comfort while participating in genetic re-
search is that their consent to participate in studies was gener-
ally given under an assurance that any information disclosed 
consequent to the study would be made in an anonymous man-
ner.134 This promise of anonymity, however, can be defeated be-
cause genetic sequence information is uniquely capable of iden-
 
 130. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 131. Apse et al., supra note 101, at 512. 
 132. See David A. Wheeler et al., The Complete Genome of an Individual by 
Massively Parallel DNA Sequencing, 452 NATURE 872, 875 (2008) (“Third-
party relatives are not typically considered research participants and their 
consent is not generally required for research participation.”). 
 133. See Harvard Medical School, Consent Form, PERS. GENOME PROJECT, 
http://www.personalgenomes.org/consent/PGP_Consent_Approved03242009.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2010) (stating that participants were “strongly encouraged 
to discuss this study and its potential risks with [their] immediate family 
members,” but were not required to seek their consent); see also Wheeler et al., 
supra note 132, at 875 (stating that, with respect to a research project result-
ing in the publication of the complete genome sequence of James Watson, the 
co-discoverer of the structure of DNA, Dr. Watson was “strongly encouraged to 
discuss these issues with biological relatives and to make a family decision 
about research participation and data release,” but that “[t]he participant’s 
autonomous decision to participation in research typically outweighs any ob-
jections raised by third-party relatives”). 
 134. See Lunshof et al., supra note 102, at 408 (“A crucial consideration is 
that consent for disclosure . . . is given only upon certain conditions; a key 
condition usually being the assurance of secrecy with regard to personal iden-
tity and information content.”). 
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tifying someone, providing greater discriminative capability 
than a person’s name or standard demographic data.135 
A striking example of being able to identify someone using 
DNA sequence was the case of a teenage boy who, with the aid 
of genetic analysis, was able to track down his anonymous 
sperm-donor father.136 In a similar vein, a direct-to-consumer 
genetics company recently announced the launch of a service 
that would let customers with DNA sequence information in its 
database identify and contact probable near and distant rela-
tives.137 To make things even worse, using newly developed ge-
netic techniques and statistical approaches, it now appears 
possible for someone to “re-identify” an individual’s genetic da-
ta from large pools of anonymized and aggregated genomic da-
ta.138 The significance of these developments is magnified when 
contextualized by the ever-expanding nature of the genetic da-
tabases that are available on the Internet and the fact that, 
once information is online, it forms what is essentially a per-
manent record that cannot be expunged.139 Thus, not only can a 
 
 135. See ASHG Response to NIH on Genome-Wide Association Studies, AM. 
SOC’Y HUM. GENETICS (Nov. 30, 2006), http://www.ashg.org/pages/statement_ 
nov3006.shtml (“[T]he most accurate individual identifier is the DNA sequence 
itself or its surrogate here, genotypes across the genome. It is clear that these 
available genotypes alone, available on tens to hundreds of thousands of indi-
viduals in the repository, are more accurate identifiers than demographic var-
iables alone . . . .”). 
 136. Alison Motluck, Tracing Dad Online, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 5, 2005, at 
6, 6 (noting that a resourceful fifteen-year-old boy was able to identify his 
anonymous sperm-donor father by sending his own DNA for analysis of Y 
chromosome (paternal lineage) markers, matching the pattern to a surname in 
a genealogy database, and then using that name along with some basic demo-
graphic information about the sperm donor to identify and contact his genetic 
father); see also Dawn R. Swink & J. Brad Reich, Caveat Vendor: Potential 
Progeny, Paternity, and Product Liability Online, 2007 BYU L. REV. 857, 857–
69 (discussing the same case and recent trends allowing for the identification 
of anonymous sperm donors through genetic analysis and the Internet). 
 137. See Lawrence Hon, Introducing Relative Finder: The Newest Feature 
from 23andMe, SPITTOON (Nov. 19, 2009, 5:13 PM), http://spittoon.23andme 
.com/2009/11/19/introducing-relative-finder-the-newest-feature-from-23andme 
(discussing the launch of the service and noting, with no apparent irony, that 
“[w]ith Relative Finder, you can discover more about your ancestry than you ev-
er thought possible!,” and that “[a]fter all, you never know who you might find”). 
 138. See Dan Vorhaus, Re-identification and Its Discontents, GENOMICS L. 
REP. (Oct. 13, 2009), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/10/13/ 
re-identification-and-its-discontents. 
 139. See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Met-
aphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2001) (noting 
that once information appears on the Internet it creates “a permanent record 
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person not be assured of anonymity of DNA sequence informa-
tion, once that genetic information has been posted on the In-
ternet it is essentially beyond his or her control forever. 
3. Criminal Law and Partial Forensic Matches 
There is at least one circumstance that, in what might oth-
erwise be characterized as an invasion of genetic privacy, re-
ceives wide support. Every jurisdiction in the United States 
maintains a database containing genetic information from of-
fenders to enable forensic DNA analysis.140 These databases 
and associated DNA-sampling programs survived constitution-
al and other legal challenges, with the judiciary determining 
that the public interest in solving crimes overcomes the privacy 
expectations of suspects.141 While, to date, these initiatives 
have been restricted to those who were convicted of, or at least 
arrested in connection with, felonies,142 some commentators 
have called for the expansion of these databases to provide for 
population-wide coverage to assist crime-prevention efforts.143 
Having considered the ways in which information regard-
ing shared DNA sequences can be used in other contexts, it 
should be no surprise to learn that similar applications are 
possible, and have begun to be used, in the criminal justice set-
ting. Forensic investigators can use “familial searching” when a 
crime-scene DNA sample comes up with a partial match to a 
sample in an offender database.144 The police have used this 
method successfully on a number of occasions in the United 
Kingdom and at least once in the United States.145 The legal 
 
of unparalleled pervasiveness and depth. . . . [A]lmost everything on the In-
ternet is being archived”). 
 140. See Greely et al., supra note 125, at 250 (“[E]very American state ha[s] 
established forensic DNA databases.”). 
 141. Aaron B. Chapin, Note, Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free 
Citizens Versus Post-Convicted Persons and the Unconstitutionality of DNA 
Dragnets, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1847–55 (2005) (reviewing the general ten-
dency under the “special needs” doctrine of the Fourth Amendment and the 
DNA Act of 2000 to uphold the legality of forensic DNA databases). 
 142. See Greely et al., supra note 125, at 250. 
 143. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databas-
es: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. 
L. REV. 413, 415; Michael Seringhaus, Op-Ed., To Stop Crime, Share Your 
Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2010, at A23, available at 2010 WLNR 5373377. 
 144. See Greely et al., supra note 125, at 248–49. 
 145. See, e.g., id. (discussing the use of familial DNA to catch several felons 
in the United States and United Kingdom); Jennifer Steinhauer, “Grim Sleep-
er” Arrest Fans Debate on DNA Use, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2010, at A14, availa-
  
2010] RELATIVE FUTILITY 705 
 
status of this procedure is not yet settled in the United States, 
with concerns relating to the constitutionality of searching fa-
milial DNA samples having, so far, escaped any significant liti-
gation.146 If the practice of familial DNA searching does become 
entrenched in criminal forensic practice, however, it could be-
come a common example of a relative’s DNA sequence being 
used to identify a person who did not wish his genetic informa-
tion to be accessible to others. In light of such developments, 
new approaches to protecting individual interests in controlling 
the access to, and use of, genetic information are needed. 
C. BEYOND GENETIC PRIVACY LAW: LOOKING TO OTHER LEGAL 
PARADIGMS FOR GUIDANCE 
Given the absence of case law on point and that federal and 
state genetic privacy legislation was not designed to deal with 
the challenges of shared genetic information, it may be helpful 
to look to other bodies of law for guidance about how to deal 
with these issues. Looking to parallels with situations in which 
one party disclosed shared, non-genetic information in a man-
ner that was adverse to the interests of another party provides 
useful analogies. 
In 2001, Susana Kaysen published a memoir in which she 
described intimate details of her relationship with Joseph Bo-
nome.147 Despite altering certain details about Bonome’s life, 
such as his occupation, and only referring to him as her “boy-
friend,” many of his friends and business clientele understood 
that he was the person portrayed in the book.148 Kaysen did not 
tell Bonome of the content of the book or seek his permission 
for publication.149 The Superior Court of Massachusetts held 
that Kaysen’s First Amendment rights to expression out-
weighed any privacy interest enjoyed by Bonome so long as the 
 
ble at 2010 WLNR 13801521 (recounting the role of familial DNA searching in 
leading to the apprehension of a serial killer in California). 
 146. See, e.g., Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A 
Genetic Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 26–
57 (2010) (examining constitutional and other legal issues associated with fa-
milial DNA searching); Kimberly A. Wah, Note, A New Investigative Lead: 
Familial Searching as an Effective Crime-Fighting Tool, 29 WHITTIER L. REV. 
909, 931–43 (2008) (making the case that familial searching does not pose in-
soluble constitutional dilemmas). 
 147. Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767, 2004 WL 1194731, at *1 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 3, 2004). 
 148. Id. at *1–2. 
 149. Id. at *1. 
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details related to matters of “legitimate public concern.”150 This 
suggests that actually overcoming the right to privacy in Mas-
sachusetts requires a publication of private facts that are of 
genuine interest to the public. The court, however, also sug-
gested that “[t]here is an additional interest in this case: Kay-
sen’s right to disclose her own intimate affairs.”151 Further, it 
noted that “it is critical that Kaysen was not a disinterested 
third party telling Bonome’s personal story . . . . Rather, she is 
telling her own personal story—which inextricably involves Bo-
nome in an intimate way.”152 Rather than requiring a balance 
with public interest, Professor Sonja West argues that when 
autobiographical speech is involved “[t]he power to decide what 
is of consequence in a person’s life story should ultimately lie 
with that person alone. As long as the content and intention of 
the speech is truly autobiographical, its perceived importance 
by others should not affect its constitutional protection.”153 
Given the proposed analogy between genetic information 
and a diary,154 it is easy to read the preceding analysis as ap-
plying to disclosure of shared genetic information without the 
consent of a relative. This raises the issue of whether a First 
Amendment right to disclose genetic information requires that 
the disclosure be in the public interest to overcome the genetic 
privacy interests of relatives. If so, it is necessary to determine 
how high a bar is set by a requirement for public interest. In 
Florida Star v. B.J.F., by holding that “where a newspaper 
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, 
punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when nar-
rowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order,”155 the 
U.S. Supreme Court set a low bar indeed. Professor Andrew 
McClurg has gone so far as to argue that the public disclosure 
tort produces an unconstitutional chilling of speech under the 
 
 150. Id. at *4 (citing Peckham v. Bos. Herald, Inc., 719 N.E.2d 888, 892 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1999)). The court came to an expansive reading of the interest, 
stating that “[t]he scope of a matter of legitimate concern to the public is not 
limited to ‘news,’ in the sense of reports of current events or activities. It extends 
also to the use of names, likenesses, or facts in giving information to the public 
for purposes of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may 
reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.” Id. 
at *5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. j (1977)). 
 151. Id. at *6. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Sonja R. West, The Story of Me: The Underprotection of Autobiograph-
ical Speech, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 905, 966 (2006). 
 154. See Annas, supra note 85, at 20. 
 155. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). 
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First Amendment.156 Following Professor Eugene Volokh’s 
claim that contract law may be able to allow the enforcement of 
confidentiality obligations, even in the face of free speech chal-
lenges,157 McClurg suggested that parties involved in intimate 
relationships have implicitly entered into contracts not to di-
vulge confidential information about each other.158 
Despite the above arguments, it is difficult to conceive of a 
court that would interfere with a person’s desire to publish his 
“own” DNA sequence data. Any such restriction, by the theories 
outlined above, could arise from some form of duty of confiden-
tiality owed by one person to others with whom he or she 
shared genetic information. While English courts apply the law 
of confidentiality broadly to cover spouses, ex-spouses, and oth-
ers, United States courts are much less inclined to impose a du-
ty of confidentiality within interpersonal relationships.159 
The related concept of spousal privilege could also serve as 
an analogous, but flawed, model for preventing disclosure of 
genetic information shared by relatives. The spousal privilege 
precludes the testimony of one spouse that might be adverse to 
the interests of the other.160 A person concerned about disclo-
sure of her DNA sequence would most likely fail in her argu-
ments that she could rely on the privilege to protect against 
disclosure of shared genetic information by her kin, as the 
spousal privilege is only available in criminal matters.161 Fur-
ther, while in the traditional model for spousal privilege one 
spouse can prevent the other from testifying even if the spouse 
is willing to do so, this approach is now a minority view, with 
the modern tendency being for the witness spouse to hold the 
 
 156. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship 
Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887, 
888 (2006). 
 157. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The 
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (2000). 
 158. See McClurg, supra note 156, at 912–15. 
 159. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recov-
ering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 126 (2007) (“[I]n England, 
spouses, ex-spouses, friends, and nearly anyone else can be liable for divulging 
confidences . . . [while] American privacy law has never fully embraced privacy 
within relationships.”). 
 160. See Milton C. Reagan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Mar-
riage, 81 VA. L. REV. 2045, 2055 (1995) (“[T]he purpose of the privilege ‘is to 
. . . prevent[ ] husband and wife from becoming adversaries in a criminal pro-
ceeding.’” (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 476 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 
1973))). 
 161. Id. 
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privilege.162 It is likely that societal forces in favor of individual 
autonomy will continue to support uncoerced choice as the ba-
sis for imposing limits on permissible testimony such as tradi-
tional forms of spousal immunity,163 and there is little reason to 
believe that the traditional doctrine would apply in the genetic 
privacy situation. 
If First Amendment and other considerations will likely 
not impede consensual disclosure of shared genetic information, 
even when doing so is against the wishes and interests of 
another, it may be more helpful to find other ways to protect 
these interests. While there is a widespread consensus in the 
community that discrimination based on one’s genetic constitu-
tion should not be allowed,164 the arguments in Part II of this 
Note suggest that limits to the ability to enforce genetic privacy 
require a more nuanced approach than what may be untenable 
attempts to protect the confidentiality of shared DNA sequence 
information. 
III.  CRAFTING SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF 
GENETIC PRIVACY   
Attempting to protect a person’s genetic privacy interests 
by preventing others from having access to that individual’s 
DNA sequence information may be ineffective because of the 
shared nature of genetic information. Rather, it may be more 
productive to focus on preventing harm brought about by the 
misuse of that data. This Part considers steps that legislators 
and others could take to strengthen protections against genetic 
discrimination. In particular, the fact that people do not have 
the untrammeled ability to control access to “their” DNA se-
 
 162. Id. at 2053–54 (noting that the traditional approach binding one 
spouse to the wishes of the other applies in only thirteen states, while the ap-
proach in which the witness spouse alone could invoke the privilege applies in 
twenty-one states, federal court, and the District of Columbia). 
 163. See, e.g., Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t It a Crime: Feminist Perspectives 
on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1032, 1064–80 
(1996) (examining and criticizing the role of traditional spousal immunity 
from a feminist perspective, and arguing that individual autonomy should 
prevail over compelled testimony). 
 164. See, e.g., Editorial, A Ban on Genetic Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
22, 2009, at WK9, available at 2009 WLNR 23542177 (welcoming the effects 
and intent of the genetic nondiscrimination features of GINA). But see Jeremy 
A. Colby, Note, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by 
the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443, 459–63 (1998) (discussing argu-
ments that have been made against genetic nondiscrimination legislation, 
most prominently by employer organizations and the insurance industry). 
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quence needs to be more widely appreciated and understood. 
Additionally, Congress could provide a powerful means to 
guard against genetic discrimination by enacting legislation 
that assures individuals know who accesses their genetic in-
formation and for what purpose. Resulting public scrutiny 
would likely produce strong normative pressures inhibiting 
misuse of genetic information and prevent possible genetic dis-
crimination. 
A. THE REAL TARGET—PREVENTING GENETIC DISCRIMINATION 
If, as suggested, the real problem is genetic discrimination, 
it is important that legislators, interest groups, and the public 
understand the difference—and indeed that there is a differ-
ence—between the need for protections against genetic discrim-
ination and the need for genetic privacy. The first step is to 
educate stakeholders about the issues involved. One way to do 
this is to educate and encourage those who purport to be expert 
in the field to use the terms carefully and correctly. As an ex-
ample of information that only serves to mislead, the public 
website for the United States Department of Energy Genome 
Program headlines an otherwise informative webpage about 
the effects of GINA with the title: “Genetics Privacy and Legis-
lation.”165 The accompanying text makes no mention of genetic 
privacy, but rather discusses the impacts of the legislation with 
respect to genetic discrimination.166 While the task of educating 
the community about the issues discussed in this Note is un-
doubtedly a challenging one, it is not hopeless.167 
Another important objective is to ensure that strong pro-
tections against genetic discrimination continue to be developed 
and enforced. It is too soon to be certain of the impact of GINA 
and other federal legislation against the occurrence of genetic 
discrimination.168 The high-profile nature of such matters will 
 
 165. Genetics Privacy and Legislation, HUM. GENOME PROJECT INFO., 
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/legislat.shtml (last 
modified Sept. 16, 2008). 
 166. See id. 
 167. Progress is evident as displayed in a recent New York Times editorial 
discussing GINA. The editorial focuses squarely on the issue of genetic dis-
crimination with no conflation between the concepts of genetic discrimination 
and genetic privacy. Editorial, A Ban on Genetic Discrimination, supra note 164, 
at WK9. 
 168. See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 75, at 174 (suggesting that GINA is 
“fatally flawed” and its goals cannot be met without addressing broader issues 
relating to the health finance system). 
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help ensure that any deficiencies in current legislation and as-
sociated regulations are quickly exposed. It is worth noting that 
GINA makes provision for, and forbids, the possibility of genet-
ic discrimination based on genetic test results performed on 
relatives.169 Other legislation and regulations, both state and 
federal, likewise should include similar provisions to ensure 
they have similar reach. 
B. TOWARD A SEMI-TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: DISCLOSING 
DISCLOSURE 
In an influential book from 1998, the science fiction writer 
and futurist David Brin developed the concept of what he 
termed the “Transparent Society.”170 He considered a world of 
ubiquitous surveillance and data gathering in which despotism 
was avoided and accountability maintained by “transparency” 
and two-way flows of information, allowing tabs to be kept on 
those behind the surveillance and data gathering.171 The point 
Brin was making was that 
[t]ransparency is not about eliminating privacy. It is about giving us 
the power to hold accountable those who would violate it. Privacy im-
plies serenity at home and the right to be let alone. It may be irksome 
how much other people know about me, but I have no right to police 
their minds. On the other hand I care very deeply about what others 
do to me and to those I love.172 
Strictly applying the same underlying precepts put forward 
by Brin to the flow of genetic information may be neither prac-
ticable nor meet the desired goals. It would probably not benefit 
a consumer who feared that an insurance company would deny 
him health insurance to have access to the complete genome 
sequence of the CEO of the insurance company. What would 
likely be more helpful is what could be called “semi-
transparency”—allowing people to know who had accessed 
their genetic information and for what purpose.  
In fact, there is already federal legislation in another 
sphere that, if applied in an analogous manner, could provide 
just the desired functionality. Congress passed the Fair Credit 
 
 169. See 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(d)(6)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 2008) (defining genetic in-
formation as including “genetic tests of family members”); see also id. 
§ 1191b(d)(5)(B) (defining family members as including any “first-degree, 
second-degree, third-degree, or fourth-degree relative”). 
 170. DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE 
US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998).  
 171. Id. at 3–14. 
 172. Id. at 334. 
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Reporting Act (FCRA) in 1970 to regulate credit reporting 
agencies.173 The FCRA, among other things, sets out permissi-
ble uses of credit reports, discusses authorized and unauthor-
ized uses, and makes provision for disclosures to consumers.174 
This last provision is of particular relevance to the discussion of 
genetic information. The FCRA requires credit reporting agen-
cies, upon request of the consumer, to disclose information in 
the consumer’s file, the sources of the information, the identifi-
cation of anyone that procured consumer reports, and reasons 
for adverse characterizations of the consumer.175 
Applying similar rules to the access to, and use of, DNA 
sequence and other genetic information would provide useful 
complements to GINA and other genetic nondiscrimination 
laws. Just as the FCRA regulates credit reporting agencies, leg-
islation controlling the use of genetic information could apply to 
entities that generate and store DNA sequence information. 
Because of the highly fragmented ways in which medical care is 
delivered in the United States, legislation aimed at controlling 
organizations storing DNA sequence information would be 
more effective if it provided for “trusted brokers” that could 
maintain sequence information databases that were independ-
ent of the end users of the data, applying a further layer of pro-
tection preventing misuse of the data.176 
Admittedly, even as the FCRA has not prevented the mi-
suse of personal financial information in cases of, for instance, 
identity theft, controls over the disclosure of genetic informa-
tion would, by themselves, probably not prevent all instances of 
genetic discrimination. Even if a person was aware that his 
employer had accessed his DNA sequence, he might not know 
what actions his employer took based on that information. 
Fundamentally, it is the task of genetic nondiscrimination leg-
islation, such as GINA, to address such abuses. Still, know-
ledge that his employer had examined his genetic information 
 
 173. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 716; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(b) (2006) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer 
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of com-
merce . . . in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer . . . .”). 
 174. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 32, at 716–19. 
 175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681g. 
 176. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, New Venture Aims to Guard Genetic Data, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2000, at C2, available at 2000 WLNR 3300345 (noting the 
example of First Genetic Trust, a company that billed itself as a “genetic bank,” 
holding a person’s genetic information in a secure account and only releasing it 
with that person’s permission). 
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shortly before terminating his employment might allow an em-
ployee to develop a case that he had been discriminated against 
because of his genetic constitution. 
It is also likely true that merely allowing people to deter-
mine the identity of those who had access to their genetic in-
formation will not result in the majority of them actually moni-
toring the use of that information. It may be necessary to 
develop easy-to-understand protocols demonstrating how to ob-
tain and understand genetic “credit reports” to encourage their 
use. Education may help allay concerns that genetic informa-
tion is too complicated to understand, but instead the impor-
tant thing is the more manageable task of being aware of the 
entities looking at the information. Further, it is reasonable to 
expect that employers, insurers, and others with inclinations to 
misuse genetic information would be more careful in their ac-
tions if they knew that the “owners” of the information could 
monitor those actions. Even if everyone did not scrupulously 
monitor access to and use of his or her genetic information, it is 
likely that public interest groups would bring instances of mis-
use to light and engender powerful normative forces inhibiting 
genetic discrimination. 
Combining efforts aimed at educating policy makers and 
the public about the distinctions between genetic privacy and 
genetic discrimination with legislation allowing people to moni-
tor access to their genetic information should empower those 
concerned about abuses of their genetic data to prevent such 
misuse. Establishing these normative forces would reduce ge-
netic discrimination by employers, insurance carriers, and oth-
er groups that might otherwise be inclined to misuse genetic in-
formation.  
  CONCLUSION   
People are both fascinated with and concerned about the 
ways that advances in biomedical research could shape their 
lives. It is imperative that physicians, scientists, and others use 
new insights into genetics to benefit the public by allowing the 
development of new disease prevention and treatment options, 
rather than hurt them by limiting access to health insurance or 
free choice of employment. Given the nature of DNA, the idea 
that an individual can maintain complete control over the way 
his or her genetic information is used is flawed. People need to 
better understand the limits inherent to genetic privacy so that 
they can make educated decisions about how to use that infor-
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mation. It would be unfortunate if the children of people like 
Alan and Keri Bearder were denied the benefit of genetic tests 
such as newborn screening programs because of concerns, how-
ever well- or ill-placed, about the fate of the DNA sequence in-
formation needed for the tests.  
As well as making comprehensive efforts to teach the pub-
lic about genetic information and the ways it can be used and 
misused, it is important that genetic nondiscrimination meas-
ures be strengthened. A protective measure that needs to be 
developed is a mechanism to allow individuals to have access to 
their genetic “report cards” and to make sure they know who 
else has had access to their genetic information. Making the 
availability and use of genetic information more transparent 
will benefit everyone by reducing opportunities for misuse of 
genetic information and the possibility of genetic discrimina-
tion. 
Efforts directed to the protection of genetic privacy at first 
glance seem uncontroversial. In trying to curtail access to ge-
netic information in ways that are ineffective because of inher-
ent limits to the extent that it is possible to control access to 
DNA sequence information and that work to prevent socially 
beneficial outcomes, genetic privacy protections may be ineffec-
tive or even harmful. Rather than concentrating attention on 
genetic privacy, directing efforts to the prevention of genetic 
discrimination will produce greater social good. 
